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Abstract
The increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has made it inevitable that their pertinence to digital
forensic investigations will increase into the foreseeable future. These devices produced by various vendors often posses
limited standard interfaces for communication, such as USB ports or WiFi/Bluetooth wireless interfaces. Meanwhile, with
an increasing mainstream focus on the security and privacy of user data, built-in encryption is becoming commonplace in
consumer-level computing devices, and IoT devices are no exception. Under these circumstances, a significant challenge
is presented to digital forensic investigations where data from IoT devices needs to be analysed.
This work explores the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis literature for the purpose of assisting digital
forensic investigations on IoT devices. EM side-channel analysis is a technique where unintentional electromagnetic
emissions are used for eavesdropping on the operations and data handling of computing devices. The non-intrusive
nature of EM side-channel approaches makes it a viable option to assist digital forensic investigations as these attacks
require, and must result in, no modification to the target device. The literature on various EM side-channel analysis
attack techniques are discussed – selected on the basis of their applicability in IoT device investigation scenarios. The
insight gained from the background study is used to identify promising future applications of the technique for digital
forensic analysis on IoT devices – potentially progressing a wide variety of currently hindered digital investigations.
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1. Introduction
Digital forensics is the field where legal investigations
are assisted by analysing digital sources of evidence. In
contrast, cybersecurity is the domain where the concern is
to ensure the security of digital data and the privacy of
their owners. In today’s modern world, technology is be-
coming increasingly prevalent in everyday life and many
people stay almost always connected to the Internet [1].
While various social networks facilitate their users to share
their life events to the rest of the world intentionally, every
computer-based device they interact with in everyday life
leaves unintentional traces of their activities. Such sources
of forensic information include computer hard disks, net-
work activity logs, removable media, internal storage of
mobile phones and many others [2].
Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging trend started as
a narrow research domain called wireless sensor networks,
which evolved into Internet-connected everyday objects.
IoT ecosystem includes a wide variety of devices, such as
smart-watches, smart TVs, CCTV cameras, medical im-
plants, fitness wearables, etc. The increasing availability
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of IoT devices across society makes it inevitable to find
them in modern crime scenes and digital forensic investi-
gations. Most of these devices comes with limited data
processing and storage capabilities and they usually pos-
sess limited standard interfaces to the outside world, such
as USB ports or WiFi/Bluetooth wireless interfaces, unlike
their PC counterparts [3].
Due to the increasing concerns regarding security and
privacy among communities, modern digital devices, such
as computer systems, mobile devices, etc., are designed
and shipped with built-in security. Popular smartphones,
such as iOS and Android based devices, encrypt their in-
ternal storage in order to protect user data from third par-
ties [4]. Each of the mainstream PC operating systems,
such as Mac OS, Windows, and Linux, provide built-in
hard disk encryption. Meanwhile, network communica-
tions, both wired and wireless, commonly employ strong
packet encryption mechanisms [5]. Modern computer hard-
ware has made the automated handling of encrypted data
an everyday possibility in consumer, industrial and mili-
tary applications [6]. Computer devices seized at a crime
scene containing encrypted data poses a significant chal-
lenge to the investigation [7, 8]. The IoT device ecosystem
is no exception for this data encryption trend making the
challenge of digital forensic investigations on IoT devices
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even more complex.
Side-channel analysis attacks have been proven to be
useful to breach security on computer systems when stan-
dard interfaces, e.g., network interfaces and data storage
devices, are sufficiently protected [9, 10, 11, 12]. In order
for a side-channel attack to be effective in practical scenar-
ios for a security breach, it has to be executable without
having physical access to the device being attacked [13].
In the case of digital investigation, the investigator has the
freedom to handle the device, and ideally, any investigative
activity must not affect or change the digital information
in the device [14]. Electromagnetic (EM) Side-channel At-
tacks is one approach that has shown promising results.
It requires minimum physical manipulations to the device
being inspected [15]. EM emissions of a device can be pas-
sively observed to infer both the internal operations being
performed and the data being handled [8]. This condition
is ideal for a digital investigator who attempts to ensure
that the device does not go though any physical changes
due to its investigation. It is worth noting that hardware
manufacturers are continuously trying to circumvent EM
side-channel attack vulnerabilities through EM shielding
and operation obfuscating enabled firmware.
This paper discusses the possibility for EM side-channel
analysis as a potential case-advancing possibility for digital
forensic analysis of IoT devices. A comprehensive analy-
sis of the literature is provided identifying some promis-
ing avenues for research and their future potential. EM
side-channel attacks for the recovery of cryptographic keys
and other forms of important information are evaluated for
potentially overcoming the encryption problem in digital
forensics on IoT devices. Since the nature of EM emis-
sion phenomena is associated with the power consumption
of computing devices [16], the literature that focuses on
power analysis attacks are also discussed where appropri-
ate.
The contribution of this work can be summarised as
follows:
• A comprehensive literature review and a compara-
tive study of the research that has been carried out
in EM side-channel analysis is provided and recent
advances are summarised.
• The scenarios where different EM side-channel at-
tacks in the literature are relevant and applicable in
digital forensic investigations are identified.
• Light is shined on several new avenues of research
that are possible to achieve in digital forensic inves-
tigations and cybersecurity through the adoption of
EM side-channel analysis techniques.
• The shortage of reliable tools and frameworks avail-
able to utilise EM side-channel analysis for digital
forensic investigations on IoT devices is identified
and the recommendations are made to overcome it.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of side-channel attacks. Sections 3, 4,
and 5 explores approaches for acquisition, unique identi-
fication, and information leakage EM emissions relevant
to digital forensics. In Section 6, the advancements in
wireless communication technologies and standardisation,
and the legal background relevant to EM side-channels are
discussed. Section 7 provides insights of possible future
ethical directions of this technique. Finally, Section 8 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Side-Channel Attacks
The topic of side-channel attacks spans a wide variety
of techniques. Each side-channel attack on a computer
system focuses on one specific unintentional leakage of in-
formation from either hardware or software [9]. Some of
such information leaking side-channels are listed below.
• The memory and cache spaces shared between dif-
ferent software.
• The amount of time a program takes to respond to
different inputs.
• The sounds different components of computer hard-
ware make.
• The amount of electricity a computer system draws.
• The EM radiation a computer hardware emits.
Computer programs contain conditional branches and
loops in order to handle inputs and produce the intended
output. Depending on the input values, the execution path
of a program can differ, which may result in a different pro-
gram execution time. It has been shown that the execution
time of encryption algorithms can reveal information re-
garding the input values provided to it, which includes the
encryption key [10]. For example, the square and mul-
tiplication segment in the RivestShamirAdleman (RSA)
algorithm checks whether a key bit is 0 or 1 before moving
into multiplication operations. Therefore, the observation
of large number of execution times with the same key and
different input data can lead to uncovering the key bits
effectively [10, 17, 18].
In environments where multiple virtual machines (VMs)
run on the same hardware, such as cloud infrastructure,
cache-based side-channel attacks are possible [11]. While
each VM has its own virtual resources, many of them are
mapped into shared physical resources including shared
cache memories. It has been shown that an attacker run-
ning a VM on a virtualised environment can spy on a vic-
tim VM through the shared cache storage. This can lead
to the extraction of sensitive information, including cryp-
tographic keys [19].
It has been shown that acoustic emanations from vari-
ous components and peripherals of computer systems can
be used to exfiltrate information [12]. Genkin et al. showed
that it is possible to distinguish between CPU operations
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by listening to acoustic emanations resulting in an attack
on the cryptographic keys of the RSA algorithm [20].
Computer displays and their video cables have also
been identified as an eavesdroppable EM source, which can
leak the image being displayed on the display. Such leak-
ages from CRT based displays have been known for several
decades [21]. Video information provided to a computer
display has synchronisation information to recognise be-
tween different lines of pixels and different frames, which
are called horizontal and vertical synchronisations. By
recognising this synchronisation information in the EM
emissions, an attacker can reconstruct the images being
displayed [22, 23].
Kocher et al. were the first to introduce power con-
sumption based side-channel attacks; simple power analy-
sis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) [24]. SPA
collects power consumption variation (in mA) over time
with a high sample rate, such as twice the clock frequency
of target cryptographic device. The waveform of the power
consumption, when plotted against time, contained pat-
terns that corresponded to the instructions of the data en-
cryption standard cryptographic algorithm (DES). If SPA
can reveal the sequence of operations, it follows that this
sequence depends on the data being handled by the algo-
rithm (due to conditional branching). Designing code to
minimise data dependent branching, which does not show
characteristic power consumption patterns for specific op-
erations, can prevent attackers from recognising what is
executing on the device [25].
DPA is a technique that can be custom tailored for
specific encryption algorithms. Kocher et al. used the
DPA technique against DES [24]. The technique was able
to guess the encryption key accurately, given sufficient ci-
pher texts and power traces for those encryption opera-
tions. The authors claim that they have used DPA to re-
verse engineer various unknown algorithms and protocols
on devices. The authors state that it may be possible to
automate this reverse engineering process. Kocher et al.
hints that these techniques (SPA, DPA) might be usable
with EM emissions too in addition to power consumption.
While various side-channel attacks are possible on com-
puter systems, it is possible to increase the advantages
achievable by combining multiple side-channels that leak
different kinds of information together [26]. For example,
power analysis and EM analysis can be performed together
in order to reduce the errors and improve the accuracy of
inferring the leaked information from a computer system.
3. Unintentional Electromagnetic Emissions
EM radiation is the underlying technology for numer-
ous of wireless communication. Meanwhile, it is a well
documented fact that electronic devices generate EM radi-
ation on unintended frequencies as a side effect of their in-
ternal operations [27]. Such unintended EM radiation are
regulated by government agencies, such as Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) in the USA, due to the
possible interference they can make on legitimate wireless
communication and the potential health issues they can
cause to the users of these devices. However, it is not pos-
sible to entirely avoid such emissions. Equipment manu-
facturers attempt to minimise it as much as possible [28].
This section discusses how EM signals are generated from
different components of a computer system, what kind of
information they may carry, and what types of methods
and tools can be used to capture these signals.
3.1. Hardware that Causes Electromagnetic Emissions
As derived from Maxwell’s equations, EM waves can
be generated by electric currents varying over time. Char-
acteristics of the EM waves being generated, such as fre-
quency, amplitude, and phase, depends on the nature of
the time varying electric current [29]. Based on this prin-
ciple, modern communication systems generate oscillating
currents on antennas that generate EM waves that prop-
agate over free space. They can be captured by another
antenna with appropriate properties. Modern digital com-
puter systems have a large number of components that
depend on electric pulses or alternating currents for their
operations. That leaves the space for EM waves to be gen-
erated at unexpected frequencies without the intention of
the system manufacturer.
There are multiple computer components that oper-
ate in a coordinated, sequential fashion according to clock
signals. Among them, both the CPU and RAM are of
particular interest. The CPU performs a cycle of fetch-
ing instructions, decodes and executes them, while RAM
maintains the data and corresponding instructions when
a computing device is powered on. EM emission signals
from these components contain a significant amount of
side-channel information regarding the events related to
software execution and data handling. On most IoT de-
vices, the CPU and RAM are included in microcontroller
(MCU) chips making it the most important EM source
on-board.
3.2. Sampling Electromagnetic Emissions
The EM emission frequencies of a target device is un-
predictable due to its dependability on various hardware
characteristics. Therefore, it is difficult to have a universal
purpose device that can be used to observe EM emissions
from a target device and interpret side-channel informa-
tion. It has been shown that small magnetic loop anten-
nas can be used for the purpose of detecting EM emis-
sions from computing devices [30]. When EM signals are
captured by a loop antenna, it requires digital sampling
before the data can be used for analysis. Theoretically,
the sample rate of the equipment should be twice that of
the maximum EM frequency required to be captured – re-
ferred to as Nyquist frequency [31]. For this reason, EM
signal sampling equipment must have a very high sample
rate. The most commonly used equipment to capture EM
signals are oscilloscopes and spectrum analysers with high
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Figure 1: Spectrograms of AM demodulated EM emissions acquired
from an Arduino device where (a) running a simple LED blink pro-
gram, (b) reprogramming the device, and (c) running a complex LED
blink program are depicted.
sample rates. The digitised data these devices capture
can be subsequently analysed in signal analysis software.
However, access to such devices for information security
professionals is not very common [32].
Software defined radios (SDRs) are getting increasingly
popular among wireless hackers, hobbyists, and security
enthusiasts who are interested in access to the radio fre-
quency (RF) spectrum. An SDR consists of a minimal
hardware component, which can be tuned to a range of
RF frequencies and then digitise it with a fast analogue-
to-digital converter (ADC). The processing of digitised RF
data is handled entirely on software [33]. A wide vari-
ety of SDR hardware and software platforms are avail-
able [34, 35, 36, 37]. Due to the enhanced flexibility pro-
vided by software, SDR platforms have become a perfect
candidate for EM side-channel attack analysis research. A
SDR can be used to scan through a wide range of frequen-
cies to locate potential EM emissions from a computer
system.
A simple set-up with an SDR platform can be used to
demonstrate the unintentional EM signals. An Arduino
Leonardo prototyping board is loaded with a simple pro-
gram to blink an LED connected to it via the general pur-
pose I/O pins. An antenna connected to an RTL-SDR
dongle is placed close to the Arduino board in order to
receive unintentional EM signals emitted from the board.
The Arduino board consists of a microcontroller chip that
operates at 16 MHz. However, the RTL-SDR dongle can-
not be tuned to frequencies below 22 MHz. Therefore, a
GNURadio script was programmed to tune the RTL-SDR
dongle to the first harmonic of the Arduino clock, i.e.,
32 MHz. Figure 1 illustrates the spectrograms of three
different EM signal samples gathered.
When two different LED blinking patterns are per-
formed by two different programs separately, the Arduino
emitted two completely different EM signal patterns. The
spectrogram shown in Figure 1 (a) illustrates the EM sig-
nal observed from a simple LED blinking program, while
the spectrogram in Figure 1 (c) illustrates the EM signal of
a more complex LED blinking program. The spectrogram
depicted in Figure 1 (b) shows the EM signal observed dur-
ing the re-programming stage of the Arduino device from
the first program to the second.
3.3. Connection Between CPU Instructions and Electro-
magnetic Emissions
As a result of executing instructions in different com-
binations by the CPU, EM signal patterns are emitted
at various frequencies and amplitudes. Depending on the
sequence of instructions, i.e., the exact program being ex-
ecuted, the output of EM noise from the CPU varies sig-
nificantly. Due to this, systematically modelling and pre-
dicting possible EM signal characteristics of a computer
processor is a difficult task. In order to identify uninten-
tional EM emissions of a computer processor, the most
practical method is scanning a large frequency spectrum
for suspected EM signals and subsequently trying to in-
terpret these identified signals for potential side-channel
information. This arduous approach is a time consuming
task that requires manual inspection by a human user.
In 2014, Callan et al. introduced a metric called SA-
VAT (Signal AVailability for an ATtacker) that measures
the EM signal power emitted when a CPU is executing
a specific pair of instructions (A and B). The authors
show that different selections of A/B instruction pairs
emit different SAVAT values, i.e., signal power [38, 39].
An improvement to the SAVAT technique is a method
called Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emana-
tions (FASE). The key idea behind the FASE technique
relies on the phenomena that when a program activity is
alternating at a frequency (falt) that affects any periodic
EM signal originating from any source at a frequency fc,
it is possible to observe two side-band signals at fc − falt
and fc +falt between the fc signal. Further improvements
to SAVAT technique enabled the possibility of identify-
ing both amplitude and frequency modulated EM emis-
sions from CPUs [40, 41, 42]. While it is evident from
existing studies that EM side-channel leakage is available
across various type of CPUs, further studies are necessary
to identify the effect of different CPU architectures to the
produced EM emissions.
4. Electromagnetic Emissions as a Signature
When a computing device running a program gener-
ates EM emissions, the patterns observable depend on the
precise settings of the device. In the EM emission spec-
trum of the Arduino device in Figure 1, it is clearly evident
that both the hardware and software settings have influ-
enced the EM emission patterns. The signal captured at
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the first harmonic frequency of the Arduino device’s sys-
tem clock, i.e., 32 MHz, is showing a varying patterns in
the spectrogram view according to the changes made to
the device. Therefore, it is clear that the target device’s
system clock is the main source of EM radiation. The
design of the printed circuit board (PCB), and character-
istics of the electronic components provide variations to
this strong signal. Meanwhile, subfigures (a), (b), and (c)
of Figure 1 clearly show that the instruction sequence, i.e.,
the program being executed on the CPU, has a significant
influence to the EM emission pattern.
4.1. Electromagnetic Emissions as a Hardware Signature
Despite the software components available on a com-
puting device, it is important to investigate whether the
hardware alone can provide a recognisable EM emission
pattern. Such a capability can lead to profiling of hard-
ware devices and components uniquely. It has been shown
that a simple EM signal acquisition device called RTL-
SDR, which demonstrated the capability to capture EM
emissions from an Arduino device, can be used to profile
computing devices uniquely. Laput et al. used a similar
device to acquire EM signals that were successfully applied
to a support vector machine (SVM) classifier to uniquely
distinguish the EM source device [43]. This possibility
has led to the idea that EM emissions from an electronic
device owned by a person can be used as an authentica-
tion token of the person instead of relying on conventional
methods, such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
tags [44, 45].
This uniquely distinguishable EM emission patterns of
a known electronic device can help to identify any poten-
tial alteration that may have applied to it. For example,
a known electronic device can be altered at the hardware
fabrication level for malicious purposes, such as accessing
stored data or eavesdropping on users’ activities. Such
hardware modifications result in a changed EM emission
pattern that can be used to identify it [46]. Similarly, a
genuine electronic device can be replaced by a counterfeit
electronic device for a malicious objective. It has been
shown that even when counterfeit hardware attempts to
follow the design of the genuine device, it still creates dis-
tinguishably different EM emission patterns compared to
their original product [47].
4.2. Electromagnetic Emissions as a Software Signature
When software runs on different computing devices, it
is clear that the hardware EM emissions are influenced by
the software instructions being executed. It is important
to consider this influence from two different aspects. The
first aspect is how uniquely the EM emissions of different
software running on the same hardware platform can be
recognised. This can be used to pin point to the exact
software running on a device. The second aspect is how
unique the same software program is when it is running
across various hardware platforms. It facilitates the unique
detection of a specific piece of software.
When software systems are being developed, require-
ments arise to debug their behaviour or find ways to in-
crease their performance. Instrumenting software by ap-
plying logging events and break points are the most com-
mon ways to identify where complex software is not per-
forming as expected. These developmental options affect
the performance of the software being inspected in addi-
tion to the overhead of their placement each time a copy
of the software needs to be inspected. It has been shown
that unintended EM emissions of the CPU can be used
to inspect software execution sequences without having to
instrument the software [48, 49, 50, 51]. Even when the
same program is running on different devices, the ability
to identify the instruction execution sequence can help to
uniquely identify the software itself.
The capability to detect software code execution se-
quence has opened up the opportunity to identify when a
computing device is running software code not intended by
the manufacturer or the owner. One possible scenario can
be software bugs or hardware faults that cause an IoT de-
vice to execute unexpected instruction sequences. Another
possible scenario can occur when an IoT device is under
an attack causing it to run malware or an unintended part
of the device’s genuine software. Stone et al. [52, 53] and
Nazari et al. [54] showed that such abnormal deviations of
software code executions on computing devices can be de-
tected using the corresponding EM emission patterns from
its execution.
Even though it has been identified that EM emission
patterns are associated with both the hardware and soft-
ware characteristics of the source device, the format of a
captured EM signal used for this identification can vary.
Instead of directly using time-domain EM signal traces,
one such alternative format is RF-DNA fingerprinting. This
is a technique to fingerprint the physical layer of RF trans-
mitting devices, which includes WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee,
GSM devices, and even RADAR antennas. This tech-
nique has been used to identify rogue devices in a deploy-
ment using their RF signals without physically inspecting
them [55, 56, 57, 58]. Deppensmith et al. showed that
RF-DNA technique can be applied to unintentional EM
emission fingerprinting on computing devices reliably [59].
However, the evaluations performed by Stone et al. on
microcontroller based IoT devices indicates that further
studies are necessary to conclude the most reliable format
to represent unintentional EM signals [60].
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of an RF-DNA finger-
print. When calculating it, the EM signals emitted from
a device on a selected frequency is captured, filtered, and
amplified appropriately to achieve a clean trace. From this
acquired time-domain EM trace, the three signal charac-
teristics; Amplitude, Phase and Frequency, are separately
considered for further processing. Each signal character-
istic is broken into N equally sized regions and then for
each region, four statistical metrics; standard deviation,
variance, skewness, and kurtosis is calculated. The stan-
dard deviation and variance metrics measure the spread
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Figure 2: The RF-DNA fingerprinting process.
of data samples, while the skewness and kurtosis metrics
measure the symmetry and the sharpness of a data sam-
ple. Furthermore, the signal itself is again considered as
a one entire region, i.e., the (N + 1)th region, to calcu-
late the same statistical metrics. As Figure 2 illustrates,
each of these calculated statistical metrics are arranged in
a single vector, which becomes the RF-DNA fingerprint of
the originally acquired EM trace from the device.
5. Information Leaking Electromagnetic Emissions
This section dives into the question of what informa-
tion is contained in an EM emission trace of a particular
computing system. From a digital forensic perspective,
both the kind of software running on IoT devices and the
data being handled by each software application are po-
tentially of significant interest. Even if EM side-channel
analysis cannot reveal all of data being handled by an IoT
device platform, extracting critical information, e.g., cryp-
tographic keys, can help progress forensic analysis.
5.1. Observable Electromagnetic Spectrum Patterns
While there exists a wide variety of microcontroller
chips used on IoT devices, Sohaib et al. has shown that
it is still viable to perform EM side-channel attacks on
them [61]. When considering information leakage from an
EM emission trace, visually inspecting the time-domain
signal is the first observational technique. This approach
is called simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA), which
evolved from the simple power analysis (SPA) introduced
by Kocher et al. [24]. Another way of performing visual
observations is by transforming the EM trace into the fre-
quency domain and plotting it as a spectrogram. This
enables observation of different signal patterns distributed
over multiple frequencies.
Multiple published works have demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of the SEMA approach in extracting critical
data from computers, including cryptographic keys. The
El Gamal and RSA algorithms implemented using GnuPG
library were attacked by observing critical CPU opera-
tions [62]. Furthermore, elliptic curve based cryptographic
algorithms (ECC), such as Elliptic Curve based Diffie Hell-
man (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve based Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), are identified to be vulnerable to
EM side-channel attacks with the SEMA approach [63,
64, 65]. Due to the low computational overhead in ECC
algorithms, many mobile devices and IoT platforms tend
to employ ECC algorithms to secure data. This indi-
cates that such devices can be inspected through EM side-
channels to access cryptographically protected data.
5.2. Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA)
If a large number of EM traces from a computing sys-
tem can be observed executing specific software, it is possi-
ble to identify the data bits involved in the operations that
appear across the large number of EM traces. While being
impractical to perform under real-world attack scenarios
due to the challenge of collecting such a large number of
EM traces from a target computer, this may be the only
resort for EM side-channel analysis when it is not possible
to extract information from visual observation of a single
EM trace.
DEMA, a variant of Differential Power Analysis (DPA),
uses the variation of EM emissions of a CPU to discover
variables used in an executing program, such as encryption
algorithms [24, 66]. When a bit in a CPU register is flipped
from 0 to 1 or vice versa, it consumes an amount of en-
ergy, which is reflected in the corresponding EM emission.
Some CPUs may emit a higher EM signal when switch-
ing a register bit from 0 to 1 than vice versa since that
operation can lead to a higher energy consumption [30].
Due to this, when the contents of a complete CPU reg-
ister are modified, it is possible to identify the hamming
distance between the previous and new state using the re-
sulting EM emission. Since every instruction running on
a CPU affects the values on different registers, this means
that attackers can identify instructions being executed and
intermediate variables used based on the EM observation.
Figure 3 illustrates how differential EM analysis is used
to identify the key of a simple XOR-cipher. Initially, a
large set of input data bytes and all possible key bytes are
used to perform XOR-operations and the hamming dis-
tances of the resulting values are stored in a matrix called
Hypothetical Matrix, as shown in Figure 3. The objective
is to find the hypothetical key of the matrix that gener-
ates matching hamming distances for the same input val-
ues. For this, the input values are fed to software running
on the CPU, where the XOR operation is performed with
the unknown key. EM emissions are sampled for each in-
put value to generate the Real Matrix, where each column
contains an EM signal sample for its corresponding input.
Calculating cross-correlations between rows of the two ma-
trices can find the corresponding row in the Hypothetical
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Figure 3: EM analysis of XOR-Cipher algorithm to extract the en-
cryption key.
Matrix that provides the best correlation of hamming dis-
tances. The hypothetical key corresponding to this row
is likely the encryption key used for the XOR operation
inside the CPU.
Standard encryption algorithms, such as the Data En-
cryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), employ XOR operations at various stages
in their functionality using chunks of the encryption key
and input data. Therefore, DEMA attacks are possible by
attacking each chunk of the key being used with the XOR
operations. Such an attack reveals parts of the encryption
key, which have to be combined at the end. However, in a
real-world setting, the attacker may not have enough EM
emission samples of the encryption operations to calculate
the correct part of the key used. This results in lists of
possible key chunks for each segment of the encryption
key used in the algorithm. The problem of identifying the
correct parts of the key to build the complete encryption
key is called the Key Enumeration Problem, which can be
solved within a reasonable computational overhead [67].
Quisquater et al. practically demonstrated that EM
analysis is a viable option to the aforementioned power
analysis attack on computer CPUs [68]. By precisely mov-
ing the EM probe over a microcontroller, the authors were
able to build an accurate 3-dimensional EM signature of
the chip running an idle loop. It was shown that the ra-
diation spectrum of each processor was sufficiently unique
to use as a distinguishable feature for processor identifi-
cation. These experiments were performed in a Faraday
cage to minimise the external noise effects and the EM
emissions were captured using a small magnetic loop an-
tenna (diameter ≈ 3mm). An oscilloscope digitised the
signal for analysis. Gandolfi et al. [69] applied DEMA to
extract encryption keys from three different chips used on
smartcards namely; COMP128, DES, and RSA. Accord-
ing to this study, the SNR of EM emissions from these
chips is higher than the SNR of power consumption anal-
ysis. This results in the extraction of more information
from the DEMA technique as compared to simple power
analysis attacks [70]. Asymmetric key encryption, such as
RSA, can also be attacked by identifying the individual
modular exponentiation operations performed within the
algorithm through EM emissions [71].
Due to the modern electronic multimedia distribution
model, e.g., music, movies, and ebooks, end-users can of-
ten become the attackers. These users might have the
malicious intention of breaking encryption or sharing Dig-
ital Rights Management (DRM) protected data. Since the
victim device is owned by the attacker, unlimited physical
access to the hardware and software becomes available for
the attacker through various side-channel attacks. White
Box Cryptography (WBC) was introduced as a solution to
this; whereby cryptographic algorithms and keys are com-
bined with random codes and random data to create an
obfuscation that makes side-channel attacks more difficult.
However, it has been shown that EM side-channel attacks,
such as DEMA, are still capable of extracting encryption
keys despite of the application of WBC techniques [72].
Recently, Camurati et al. made an important discov-
ery that extended the previously known capabilities of
EM side-channel analysis of cryptographic operations on
IoT devices [73]. It was shown that mixed-signal proces-
sors, such as system-on-chips (SoCs), that contains a radio
transceiver and a CPU on the same silicon die, can cause
long distance EM leakages. This occurs when the CPU
noise gets modulated into the radio transceiver’s emission
– extending the range of the CPU EM side-channel. As
the usage of SoCs is getting increasingly popular on IoT
devices, this latest type of EM side-channel leakage, called
screaming channels, has significantly increased the poten-
tial attack surface.
5.3. Analysis on Wireless-Powered Devices
Unlike traditional computing devices that have their
own power source to run CPU operations, wireless-powered
devices, e.g., passive RFIDs, depend on an external RF
field provided by the device’s reader for power [74]. IoT de-
vices are ideal candidates to be powered by wireless means.
EM side-channel analysis on such devices is challenging
due to the presence of a strong RF field from the reader,
which obfuscates the weak EM emissions of the devices
themselves. However, RFID based devices are being used
in critical systems, such as secure access control to build-
ings and electronic payments, where cryptographic opera-
tions are performed on-board. Therefore, investigating the
EM side-channel capability on such devices is important
from both security and forensic standpoints.
Hutter et al. demonstrated the capability to perform
EM side-channel analysis on RFID based devices using a
custom-made RFID tag as a proof of concept [75]. Using
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this custom set up, the authors were able to recover the
AES key used in a challenge response protocol between
the RFID tag and the reader. In order to avoid the dis-
turbance from the RF field of the reader device, the RFID
circuitry was placed outside the reader’s RF field, while
the power harvesting antenna is kept inside the reader’s
RF field. The two components were connected through
a sufficiently long wire. This enabled the measurement
of the EM emissions from the RFID circuitry without in-
terference. However, it is not possible to follow a similar
approach in a regular RFID tag as the antenna and RFID
circuitry are inseparable by any reasonable means.
Kasper et al. performed EM side-channel attacks on
RFID based smart-cards in a more realistic setting. This
research employed commercially available smart-cards and
performed the attacks within the RF field of the RFID
reader [76]. When the RFID smart-card is consuming
more energy, the amplitude of the RFID readers RF field
becomes lower. Similarly, when the RFID smart-card is
consuming less energy, the amplitude of the RFID read-
ers field is higher. This means, the power consumption of
the RFID tag is reflected in the amplitude of the RFID
readers carrier frequency. Kasper et al. used this signal
as the EM side-channel to attack internal operations of
the RFID reader. A computer-controlled USB-oscilloscope
and a computer-connected custom-made RFID reader was
used to attack the RFID tag while capturing EM fluctua-
tions using a small RF loop probe. This set up was used
to perform a correlation power analysis (CPA) attack to
extract the symmetric keys used in DES and 3-DES im-
plementations on the smart-card successfully.
Recent research by Xu et al. demonstrated that RFID
based smart-cards that employ side-channel attack mit-
igation techniques, such as head and tail protection, are
not effective enough against EM side-channel analysis at-
tacks [77]. In their work, encryption keys used for the
3DES algorithm were demonstrated to be recoverable. In
light of this attack vector, it is important to note that
wireless-powered IoT devices are also susceptible to threats
from EM analysis based attacks.
Many smart-card-based fraud, such as stealing credit
card details, involve malicious devices, such as card skim-
mers, that can read and store data from the cards. Inves-
tigators face the challenge of identifying victims of such
skimming devices due to the fact that card details are
encrypted when stored on these devices. Souvignet and
Frinken demonstrated that correlation power analysis, which
is a variant of DPA attack, can be used to extract the de-
tails of victim smart-cards from such skimmer devices by
physically tapping into a seized device [78]. The success of
their work indicates that EM side-channel analysis can be
even more promising in extracting such evidence without
requiring any physical alterations to the device itself.
5.4. Countermeasures to Electromagnetic Side-Channels
As EM side-channel analysis has been shown to be suc-
cessful on recovering data from computing devices, various
countermeasures have been explored to counteract it on
both software and hardware levels [25]. Masking variables
by using random values alongside the operations is a ba-
sic software-based countermeasure that has been proven
to not be effective enough against EM side-channel at-
tacks [79, 80]. Various other approaches including the
randomisation of the operation sequences or lookup tables
of algorithms [81, 82], avoiding instructions pairs execut-
ing adjacently that are known to emit distinguishable EM
patterns [38, 39], and accessing critical data using point-
ers instead of values [83] require further studies to see how
effective they are against EM side-channel attacks.
Quisquater et al. suggests several hardware design
countermeasures to these attacks [68]. Actions that can
be taken by hardware designers includes minimising metal
parts in a chip to reduce EM emissions, the use of Faraday
cage like packaging, making the chip less power consum-
ing (which leads to less unintentional emissions), asyn-
chronism (i.e., design the chip not to use a central sys-
tem clock and instead operate asynchronously), and the
use of dual line logic (i.e., using two lines that in com-
bination of two bits represents a state instead of a single
line that simply represent 0 or 1 states). Furthermore,
it has been shown that it is possible to mathematically
model an electronic chip during the design phase to iden-
tify and avoid potential information leakages through EM
side-channels [84, 85].
6. Standards and Tools
EM side-channel attacks are not currently commonly
being used for digital forensics purposes. Therefore, it can
be too early to find any existing standards or tools on
EM side-channel analysis for digital forensics. However,
in order for future establishment of standards and tools, it
is important to review the relevant standards and tools in
both hardware and software security domains.
The concerns of electromagnetic wave emissions from
IoT devices from the software perspective are mostly con-
centrated towards the wireless communication technolo-
gies, such as WiFi, Bluetooth, and proprietary IoT proto-
cols, e.g., Zigbee [86, 87]. Meanwhile, unintentional EM
emission minimisation is generally left to those involved in
the hardware design and manufacturing process. The term
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) refers to a device’s
unintentional EM emissions that can affect the function-
ality of other devices and the health of humans who are
exposed to it [27]. The Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and
the European Union (EU) are examples of authorities con-
cerned with EMC [88, 89]. However, regarding the ques-
tion of EM side-channel information leakage from gen-
eral purpose electronic devices, there are no such rules to
govern the manufacturers. Instead, only guidelines exist,
which may or may not be followed [90, 91].
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Figure 4: Altering the traditional IoT digital evidence acquisition process [14], EM side-channel analysis can help in various ways for live
analysis of computing devices.
Once a hardware device’s design is completed and man-
ufacturing commences, it is a challenging task to apply
mitigation steps should the EMC tests reveal that it does
not meet requirements. In the worst case scenario, the
minimisation of EM emissions may require a complete re-
working of the PCB used in the device or a replacement
of a critical electronic component. Due to the potential
for costly manufacturing disruption, the minimisation of
EM emissions is necessary from the initial hardware design
phase. Due to the fact that EM side-channel information
leakage is not a problem limited to hardware manufactur-
ers, a joint effort by both hardware and software developers
to establish standards is necessary.
In order to facilitate the assessment on EM side-channel
security threats, standardised tools and frameworks are
highly necessary. Test vector leakage assessment (TVLA)
is a technique that can be used to assess the resistance
of cryptographic implementations against hardware side-
channel attacks [92]. TempestSDR is a software tool that
can be used with a large variety of hardware platforms,
e.g., the universal software radio peripheral1 (USRP) or
HackRF 2, to eavesdrop on computer monitors by captur-
ing the EM signals emitted by the video cables [93, 94].
Multiple commercial and open source products exist that
1https://www.ettus.com/
2https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/
can be used to break encryption on microcontroller based
IoT devices, such as ChipWhisperer [95, 96] and Riscure
Inspector [97, 98]. Blanco et al. presented a side-channel
trace acquisition framework called SCAP, which is tar-
geted at general purpose computing devices (including mo-
bile devices). While the framework does not currently per-
form side-channel attacks, the objective is to provide a
platform to build future analysis tools [99]. Such tools en-
able IoT system developers to test the robustness of their
hardware against physical side-channel attacks and iden-
tify information leakage.
7. Discussion
Having discussed the scientific literature related to EM
side-channel analysis attacks, it is important to identify
the future impact it may cause in the domain of digital
forensics on IoT devices. This section highlights some of
the potential ways this impact may occur in the future
under different themes. Figure 4 illustrates the avenues
for future research in this direction. Many of these future
potentials are already starting to be realised and others
are ambitious predictions that can prove significantly ben-
eficial to digital forensics.
Recent versions of mobile operating systems, e.g., An-
droid and iOS, secure their internal storage using encryp-
tion. Critical information necessary for digital forensic in-
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vestigation can be inaccessible due to being stored in an
encrypted form [100, 101, 102]. This includes encrypted
emails, encrypted instant messenger applications, encrypted
files, and encrypted storage partitions. While the increas-
ing application of cryptographic protection on computing
devices poses a challenge to traditional digital forensics,
it can open up new opportunities to EM side-channel at-
tacks [7]. EM side-channel attacks require a large num-
ber of traces acquired from a victim device while the de-
vice is performing cryptographic operations using a single
key. The most common encryption operations occurring
on older systems are the secure socket layer (SSL) based
web traffic [103]. With encrypted data storage becoming
commonplace, EM side-channel attacks can potentially be
performed by observing cryptographic operations during
live data forensic analysis procedures [104].
Instead of using a single side-channel attack in iso-
lation, combinations of multiple side-channel attacks di-
rected towards a single computer system can prove more
fruitful. It has been proven that power and EM side-
channel analysis can be combined to achieve better re-
sults [26]. There can be some operations of the CPU
that are more clearly reflected in the device’s power con-
sumption than in the EM emission and vice versa. Sim-
ilarly, malware running on a victim computer can aid an
EM side-channel attacker to extract additional informa-
tion (over the EM side-channel alone) by intentionally
modulating data into the EM emission of the CPU or the
monitor [105, 106, 94].
The unintentional EM emissions from computing de-
vices can cause interference to other radio signals in the
vicinity. This phenomena is evident in laptop computers,
which have been shown to modulate signals from com-
mercial AM radio stations [107]. IoT devices already use
this interference phenomena to communicate purposefully
with other devices by modulating the ambient RF signals.
This is called backscatter communication technology [108].
There are various carrier wave sources that have been
tested in the literature including TV transmission stations
and WiFi access points [109, 110, 111, 112]. The potential
of using this backscatter phenomena to eavesdrop on inter-
nal CPU operations of IoT devices by listening to ambient
RF sources warrants further exploration.
Devices deployed in wired networks, such as routers
and switches, are known EM noise sources. It has been
already showed that MAC addresses in Ethernet frames
can be extracted by performing SEMA analysis on the EM
emissions from wired routers [113]. When it is required
to perform an investigation on a live wired network, it is
necessary to be connected in order to inspect packets [114].
In situations like this, the EM emissions of routers and
switches might be able to provide an approximate picture
of the workload and traffic on the network [115].
Recent advances that have been made in the area of
artificial intelligence (AI) (incorporating machine learning
(ML) and deep learning (DL)) have demonstrated promis-
ing applications to many other domains across computer
science. Various tasks where human intuition was required
to perform decision making are now being replaced with
ML/DL powered algorithms. Software libraries and frame-
works are becoming increasingly available in order to as-
sist the building of applications that have intelligent ca-
pabilities. Examples include the automated detection of
malicious programs [116], image manipulation [117], and
anomaly detection in network traces [118].
EM side-channel analysis techniques that previously re-
quired human intervention can be automated through the
development of AI algorithms. Recent work by Wang et
al. [119] applied deep learning algorithms including multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) and long short-term memory (LSTM)
to detect anomalies in the code of simple IoT devices, e.g.,
Arduino and Raspberry Pi, through the power consump-
tion side-channel. Therefore, it is potentially possible to
extract better information from EM traces than the cur-
rent manual observations are capable of achieving. Several
examples that were discussed in previous sections already
leverages AI techniques to recognise EM trace patterns,
which strongly hints the future role that can be played
by AI algorithms in EM side-channel analysis for digital
forensics [43, 120, 48, 49, 54, 60].
8. Conclusions
Traditionally, digital forensics focuses on analysing traces
left behind by suspects on digital devices by inspecting file
storage, log files, network traces, etc. Live data forensics
can also be performed on systems that require more so-
phisticated investigative techniques and skills. As com-
puting systems transform from less privacy and security
concerned platforms into hardened platforms that are de-
signed with security in mind from their inception, the typ-
ical work conducted by digital forensic investigators must
change accordingly. Cryptographically protected storage
systems is one of the largest challenges hindering efficient
digital forensic analysis. EM side-channel analysis has
been demonstrated as a potential door-opener for cryp-
tographically protected data storage and communications
from a security perspective, which can be built upon and
adopted for digital forensic purposes.
This paper comprehensively analysed the literature on
EM side-channel attacks with the goal of applying the
technique to assist digital forensic investigations on IoT de-
vices. While various mitigation techniques have been sug-
gested and applied to counter against EM side-channel at-
tacks, existing literature demonstrates that such attempts
have not been successful in reducing the prevalence of
this attack vector. EM side-channel analysis is still in its
infancy for digital forensic applications, which demands
court-admissible, forensically-sound processing when used
not only for obtaining security keys but also for the de-
tection of unintentional data leakage. However, this tech-
nique has significant potential to have a substantial im-
pact on the field and enable the progression of otherwise
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stalled investigative cases involving both IoT devices, and
encrypted computing devices in general.
APPENDIX
A categorisation of the literature of EM side-channel
attacks and related areas are listed in Table 1.
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